

Message Text

SECRET

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44

ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5629

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ATHENS 7335

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR PFOR GR US

SUBJECT: US-GREEK BASE NEGOTIATIONS - GREEK RESPONSE
ON MAJOR QUESTIONS

REF: A. ATHENS 7268; B. STATE 177793;

C. STATE 177222; D. STATE 177221

1. CALOGERAS MET WITH STEARNS THIS AFTERNOON TO CONVEY GREEK POSITIONS ON SEVEN MAJOR ISSUES REMAINING OPEN AFTER WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS WHICH WERE THE SUBJECT OF AMBASSADOR KUBISCHS DEMARCHE TO BITSIOS JULY 17 (REFTELS A AND C). CALOGERAS EMPHASIZED THAT GREEK POSITION ON THESE ISSUES HAD BEEN REVIEWED BY COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WHICH HAD AGREED TO CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS WHICH GREEK GOVT HOPED WMULD CONTRIBUTE TO EARLY SIGNATURE OF US-GREEK DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT. FOLLOWING ARE MODIFIED GREEK POSITIONS ON MAJOR ISSUES AS ADDRESSED BY CALOGERAS.

2. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. GREEK MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED CALOGERAS TO THE US WERE NOT REPEAT NOT ENTIRELY SATISFIED THAT THE EQUIPMENT WE WERE OFFERING THE GREEK GOVT TO CREATE A NATIONAL ELINT CAPABILITY WAS COMPLETELY SUITABLE TO GREEK NEEDS. CALOGERAS SAID THAT HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE DETAILS BUT UNDERSTOOD FROM KOURIS THAT THE GREEK MILITARY

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BELIEVED THAT EQUIPMENT USED BY THE US NAVY WAS BETTER

ADAPTED TO GREEK CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS THAN THE US AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT WE WERE OFFERING. KOURIS HAD RAISED A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WITH NSA REPRESENTATIVES AND CALOGERAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING THIS WEEK. ASSUMING THAT GREEK CONCERNS ABOUT THE SUITABILITY OF EQUIPMENT WERE SATISFIED, CALOGERAS SAID THAT THE GREEK GOVT SUGGESTED THAT US PRE-CONDITIONS BE MET IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:

A. REQUIREMENT FOR US-ONLY OPERATIONS AREAS AT IRAKLION AND HELLENIKON. THE GREEK GOVT BELIEVED THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND BY IMPLEMENTING THE PROCES VERBAL ALONG LINES DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON BY KOURIS AND NSA REPRESENTATIVE FINK. SPECIFICALLY, AT GOURNES (IRAKLION) AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED THAT GREEK PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED TO PARTICIPATE IN SHARING INFORMATION REGARDING COMMON THREAT TARGETS WOULD ALSO BE PERMITTED TO OVERSEE OR MONITOR THE FREQUENCIES USED BY US PERSONNEL IN ACTIVITIES NOT REPEAT NOT DIRECTED AGAINST COMMON THREAT TARGETS. A LIMITED AGREEMENT OF THIS KIND, CALOGERAS BELIEVED, WOULD ALLAY ANY CONCERN ON THE GREEK SIDE THAT GREECE ITSELF WAS BEING TARGETED WITHOUT INTERFERING IN US COLLECTION ACTIVITIES UNRELATED TO GREEK DEFENSE NEEDS.

B. US FLIGHT OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN AEGEAN AGAINST MUTUAL THREAT TARGETS. AFTER CAREFUL RECONSIDERATION OF GREEK POSITION, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAD DECIDED NOT TO INSIST THAT GREEK OBSERVER FLY IN US AIRCRAFT. THE GREEK GOVT WAS STILL CONSIDERING ITS POSITION ON PERMITTING US TO RESUME FLIGHTS OVER THE NORTHERN AEGEAN IN THE INTERIM PERIOD PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GREEK AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY. THE PRINCIPAL CONSIDERATION FOR THE GREEK GOVT WAS THAT GREEK NATIONAL SECURITY NOT BE JEOPARDIZED BY SUCH RESUMPTION.

C. SHARING OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY GREECE AGAINST MUTUAL THREAT TARGETS. WHEN THE NATIONAL GREEK

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CAPABILITY HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, CALOGERAS REAFFIRMED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN SHARING WITH US ALL INFORMATION COLLECTED AGAINST MUTUAL THREAT TARGETS.

3. HELLENIKON. REGARDING AGREED US FORCE LEVELS AT HELLENIKON AND RELOCATION OF DEPENDENT SUPPORT ACTIVITIES, CALOGERAS SAID THAT GREEK POSITION REMAINED THE SAME. US WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ITS PRESENCE AT HELLENIKON TO

1050 LEVEL ANDNRELOCATE ALL DEPENDENT SUPPORT ACTIVITIES EXCEPT BASE HOSPITAL. STEARNS NOTED THAT A NEW ELEMENT HAD BEEN INTRODUCED INTO CALCULATIONS ON HELLENIKON. GREEK GOVT HAD RECENTLY ANNOUNCED FIRM DECISION TO CLOSE HELLENIKONAND REPLACE IT WITH NEW INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AT SPATA. WHILE TIMING OF THIS MOVE WAS STILL UNCLEAR, IT HAD ALSO BEEN REPORTED THAT HELLENIC AIR FORCE BASE AT HELLENIKON WOULD MOVE OUT OF HELLENIKON BEFORE COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS TERMINATED THERE. FROM A PRACTICAL STANDPOINT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE US AIR FORCE TO UNDERTAKE A PROGRAM OFRELOCATION UNTIL GREEK PLANS WERE FIRM. THE GREEK GOVT COULD NOT EXPECT US TO MOVE OUT OF HELLENIKON UNTIL WE KNEW WHAT THE GREEKS HAD IN MIND. CALOGEAAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE US HAD A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN KNOWING THE FUTURE OF THE GREEK BASE AT HELLENIKON BEFORE MAKING CONCRETE DECISIONS ON RELOCATION AND HE UNDERTOOK TO CHECK WITH THE HELLENIC AIR FORCE ON THIS POINT. HE EMPHASIZED HOWEVER THAT THE GREEK GOVT STOOD FIRM ON THE PRINCIPLE OF REDUCTION IN THE US PRESENCE AT HELLENIKONAND RELOCATION OF DEPENDENT SUPPORT ACTIVITIES ELSEWHERE IN THE ATHENS AREA.

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EXDIS

4. SOUDA. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WAS NOT ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE OUR REQUEST FOR UTILIZATION OF SOUDA AIRFIELD BY LIMITED NUMBERS OF US TACTICAL AIRCRAFT. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS BELIEVED THAT THIS

WOULD CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF THE FACILITY AND COULD NOT MODIFY THE GREEK POSITION IN THIS REGARD. CALOGERAS SAID THAT, AS HE AND HIS MILITARY COLLEAGUES HAD INDICATED IN WASHINGTON, THE GREEKS WERE PREPARED TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY REGARDING UTILIZATION OF SOUDA BY OTHER TYPES OF US AIRCRAFT INCLUDING HELICOPTERS.

5. NEA MAKRI AND DCS. CALOGERAS SAID THAT THE GREEKS WERE "VERY DISAPPOINTED" THAT THE US WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE FUNDING ABOVE THE \$700 MILLION TO COVER ESTIMATED COSTS OF \$12 MILLION FOR TWO LOW-FREQUENCY HELLENIC NAVY CIRCUITS AT NEA MAKRI AND \$30 MILLION FOR DCS CIRCUITS LINKING THE AEGEAN ISLANDS. IN THE FACE OF US INSISTENCE THAT WE COULD NOT FUND THESE GREEK FACILITIES ABOVE THE \$700 MILLION CEILING, THE GREEK GOVT WAS "RELUCTANTLY" WITHDRAWING ITS REQUEST FOR SPECIAL FUNDING. CALOGERAS SAID HOWEVER THAT THE GREEKS HOPED THAT UNDER FMS IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE WITH USG HELP TO OBTAIN THE EQUIPMENT AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE PRICE, HOPEFULLY A PRICE SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW THE ESTIMATED TOTAL COST OF \$42 MILLION. GOG WOULD APPRECIATE SECRET

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OBTAINING AN ESTIMATE FROM WASHINGTON AGENCIES ON THE CHEAPEST POSSIBLE PRICE AT WHICH IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE GOG, WITH US ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE IN PROCUREMENT, TO CONSTRUCT TWO LF CIRCUITS AT NEA MAKRI AND HELLENIC MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS LINKING THE AEGEAN ISLANDS. STEARNS SAID THAT HE WOULD CONVEY THIS GREEK REQUEST TO WASHINGTON ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT OF COURSE SAY WHETHER COSTS LOWER THAN \$42 MILLION WERE FEASIBLE.

6. PARITY IN PROCUREMENT. CALOGERAS SAID THAT GREEK GOVT WAS STILL CONSIDERING THE PROPOSED US TEXT AND WAS COMPARING IT WITH THE TEXT OF ASSURANCES PROVIDED BY THE US TO THE TURKISH GOVT AS CONTAINED IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. CALOGERAS WAS HOPEFUL THAT THIS ISSUE COULD BE RESOLVED WITHOUT UNDUE DIFFICULTY.

7. UNILATERAL SUSPENSION. AFTER FURTHER CONSIDERATION GREEK SIDE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF ORAL ASSURANCES AND TO RELINQUISH ITS DEMAND FOR WRITTEN ASSURANCES. THE PROBLEM COULD BE RESOLVED IN THE TERMS IN WHICH IT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BY CALOGERAS WITH ASSISTANT SECY HARTMAN, NAMELY, BY A STATEMENT MADE BY THE US REPRESENTATIVE AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE OF THE DCA THAT "SHOULD A GREEK NATIONAL EMERGENCY RESULT IN THE NEED TO SUSPEND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE US FORCES IN GREECE, THE US WOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THIS WAS WITHIN

THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF GREECE." GREEK GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD THAT SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ITSELF REFER TO THE STATEMENT PUBLICLY ALTHOUGH THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD FEEL FREE IN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE TO PUT ON THE RECORD HIS OWN VIEWS ON THE RIGHT OF UNILATERAL SUSPENSION AND WOULD EXPECT THAT ANY STATEMENT MADE BY HIM WOULD NOT BE USED BY US SPOKESMAN AS LONG AS IT WAS CONSISTENT WITH OUR ORAL UNDERTAKING AND THE OBSERVE OF ARTICLE XVIII WHICH WE HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT IN THE ORIGINAL GREEK DRAFT OF THE DCA. CALOGERAS ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WOULD OURSELVES ADVISE APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFIDENTIAL ORAL ASSURANCES WE WOULD BE PROVIDING.

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8. COMMUNICATIONS JOINT-USE PLAN. CALOGERAS SAID THAT THE GREEK SIDE WAS PREPARING ITS DRAFT FOR THE JOINT-USE PLAN FOR THE DCS. HE AGREED WITH STEARNS THAT THIS NEED NOT TAKE THE FORM OF AN ADDITIONAL APPENDIX TO THE DCA AND SAID THAT THE GREEKS WOULD SUBMIT THEIR IDEAS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE JOINT-USE PLAN COULD BE COVERED IN AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES. HE THOUGHT THAT THE GREEK DRAFT WOULD BE READY IN TIME FOR IT TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN TALKS WERE RESUMED IN ATHENS, HOPEFULLY NEXT WEEK.

9. LASTLY, CALOGERAS SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT THE FOREGOING MODIFICATIONS IN THE GREEK POSITION ON MAJOR ISSUES WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT NEGOTIATIONS TO BE RESUMED ON MONDAY, JULY 26. HE THOUGHT PERSONALLY THAT THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES WERE BRIDGABLE AND THAT WE MIGHT BE IN A POSITION TO INITIAL AN AGREEMENT BY THE FIRST WEEK OF AUGUST. STEARNS COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH WE WERE INCHING OUR WAY FORWARD, THERE WERE STILL DIFFICULT PROBLEMS BOTH OF PRINCIPLE AND DETAIL TO BE RESOLVED. HE WOULD HOWEVER CONVEY GREEK VIEWS PROMPTLY TO WASHINGTON AND OBTAIN REACTION OF WASHINGTON AGENCIES TO THEM AS WELL AS TO THE FEASIBILITY OF RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS ON JULY 26.

10. COMMENT: PRIOR TO DISCUSSION REPORTED ABOVE, STEARNS PASSED TO CALOGERAS OUR PROPOSED WORDING FOR ARTICLE IX, PARA 1, OF THE COMMAND AND CONTROL APPENDIX (AS TRANSMITTED REFTEL B). CALOGERAS SAID THAT GREEK SIDE WOULD STUDY US FORMULATION CAREFULLY AND LET US KNOW THEIR REACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. KUBISCH

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